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signed to facilitate immediate reabsorption of the technologically unemployed.39 In
addition, the desirability and nature of a particular improvement-whether it performs a new job or merely does an old one cheaper-might be considered. Such legislation would not replace, but would rather supplement, existing anti-injunction legislation.

Procedure-Illinois Civil Practice Act-Power of Appellate Court to Consider
Evidence Not Offered at Trial-[Ilinois].-The plaintiff's husband, insured under the
provisions of a life insurance policy issued by the defendant insurance company, had
obtained a lower premium rate by dating the policy back approximately two months.
The insured failed to pay a premium and died a few days after the expiration of the
thirty-one day period of grace. Had the policy been dated as of the date of issuance,
insured's death would have been prior to the anniversary date of the policy. The nonforfeiture clause gave the insured the right to elect, within a period of three months
after default, any of the following three options: a) to receive the cash surrender value
less any indebtedness, b) to apply this net amount to purchase paid-up insurance,
or c) to continue extended term insurance for a period purchasable by the cash value
reduced by any indebtedness. No election had been made by the insured. The plaintiff-beneficiary brought an action in the Circuit Court of Cook County on the theory
that the insured had really died before default, because the anniversary date of purchase was the date of issuance rather than the earlier date stated in the policy. The
defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained. On appeal to the Appellate
Court for the First District, it was held that the plaintiff's contention that the policy
was in full force because the date of issuance was its real anniversary date was erroneous, but that the plaintiff had a cause of action based upon the non-forfeiture clause
in the policy.'
Before the trial court on remand the defendant insurance company filed an aflidavit of merits which stated that the insured had borrowed on his policy so large a
sum that the loan plus interest would reduce the cash surrender value of the policy
to $1.48. The affidavit further stated that the term of extended insurance which $1.48
would purchase was only four and a fraction days, and that therefore the policy had
lapsed before the date of the insured's death. A motion by the plaintiff to strike the
defendant's affidavit for insufficiency on the theory that the sum available for the purchase of any option was the gross surrender value rather than the net cash surrender
value was sustained by the circuit court. The defendant chose to stand on its affidavit
and judgment was entered against the defendant. On appeal, it was held that the
company had the right to reduce the benefits available under any of the options by
an amount in proportion to the indebtedness outstanding.F
On remand again, judgment was entered for the defendant after trial without a
jury. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the policy necessarily remained in force because
no option had been exercised during the three month period and no alternative method
for filling this period was provided. It was held that the death of the insured before
he had made an election did not deprive the beneficiary of rights under the options,3
Philip Murray, in TNEC Hearings, op. cit. supra note 34, at 165o8.
'Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 282 Ill. App. 439 (i935).
Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 290 Ill. App. 378, 8 N.E. (2d) 535 (1937).
3 Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 304 11. App. 26x, 26 N.E. (2d) 742 (I939).
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and on petition for rehearing, it was held that there could be no change in the status of
the policy during the three month option period until an election had been made. Since
no election was made, the insurance was in full force at the death of the insured.4
The supreme court granted defendant's petition for leave to appeals The plaintiff
for the first time argued that the insured had a right to pay off the loan and that
this right survived to the beneficiary so that she might obtain the full benefits of option (c). Held, that the insured had a right, implied from the absence of any provision
in the policy denying that right, to pay back the loan during the option period and to
receive the full benefits of any one of the three options. This right survived upon his
death to the beneficiary, who may recover under option (c) the face value of the
6
policy less the indebtedness. judgment affirmed, two justices dissenting.
On petition for rehearing, the defendant moved that it be permitted to introduce,
pursuant to Section 92 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,7 photostatic copies of a loan
agreement, which by its terms specifically denied the right of the insured to pay back
in cash any indebtedness outstanding after default in premium payment. Held, that
Section 92 is unconstitutional s insofar as it "attempts to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction on the appeal of a cause of matters germane upon the trial." Petition
denied in a per curiam opinion. Schmidt v. EquitableLife Assurance Society.9
A motion by the defendant that the court reverse the judgment and remand for a
partial new trial so that the new evidencemight be offeredwas denied without opinion.lo
The court's disposal of the instant case may be criticized upon two grounds. First,
if the case be considered only upon the evidence in the record before the court, the
view of the majority as to the nature of the beneficiary's right to elect an option is
questionable. Under the level payment plan of life insurance premiums, the insured
pays in his younger years an amount in excess of that necessary to insure him against
4 Ibid., at 27o and 746 (i94o).
sThe plaintiff stated her theory of recovery as follows: "The plaintiff is not seeking to recover under any of the three options or because of an election thereof, but because the policies
necessarily remained in effect and in status quo until such election should be made." Answer to
Petition for Leave to Appeal, at ig.
183, 33 N.E. (2d) 485 (1941).
6 Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 376 Ill.

7Ill. Rev. Stat. (194) c. 1i, § 216. Several other states have enacted similar provisions.
Calif. Civ. Proc. Code (Deering, 1937) §956a; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, x935) § 6o-3316;
Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 231, § 125. For discussion of the purpose of such statutes, consult
McCaskill, Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated 329-34 (1933); Clark, The New Illinois Civil
Practice Act, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 209, 222-23 (1933). For a discussion of the litigants' rights
to a jury trial under such a provision, consult Albertsworth, Leading Developments in Procedural Reform, 7 Corn. L. Q. 310, 327-28 (X922); 36 Yale L. J. 570 (1927), noting Haynes v.
Greene, 48 R.I. 38, 134 AtI. 853 (1926).
s The supreme court's original jurisdiction is limited to "cases relating to the revenue, in
mandamus and habeas corpus ......" Ill. Coast. art. 6, § 2. The decision in the instant case
8o, 32 N.E. (2d) 897 (i94i),
might have been anticipated after Goodrich v. Sprague, 376 Ill.
noted in 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 786 (194). Cf. Wideman v. Faivre, ioo Kan. 102, 163 Pac. 619
(1917).
183, 197, 33 N.E. (2d) 485, 492 (1941).
9 376 Ill.
oMotion to Set Aside Judgment, Remand Cause for Partial New Trial and Modify
Opinion, and Suggestions in Support Thereof.
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death at that time so that the later premiums, when death becomes imminent, will
not be prohibitive. This excess forms the reserve or cash surrender value which the
courts protect as the equity of the insured in the policy." To prevent the insurance
company from retaining this equity as a windfall and to avoid its forfeiture, courts
12
will construe any ambiguous language most strongly against the insurer. The right
case, has
instant
in
the
involved
clause
of
non-forfeiture
the
type
under
of election,
been quite generally held to survive to the beneficiary;'3 and, where the beneficiary
has failed to make a formal election, it has often been held that the beneficiary would
have chosen the most favorable option.14 In none of these cases, however, is the right
of the beneficiary to repay outstanding loans involved. The implied right of the insured himself to repay any indebtedness after default has been refused by some courts
until after reinstatement of the policy s but even if the insured does have the right it
does not necessarily follow that this right survives to the beneficiary. After the death
of the insured, the risk insured against has occurred and the beneficiary would seem
to have no claim to further protection, but only a right to the proceeds of the insurance purchased by the insured prior to his death. 6 To hold otherwise permits the bene"xFriend v. Southern States Life Ins. Co., 58 Okla. 448, x6o Pac. 457 (i916); Girard Life
Ins. Co. v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 97 Pa.

15,

26 (i88r).

Cf. Mack v. Liverpool and London and Globe Ins. Co., Ltd., 329 Ill. 158, 163, 16o N.E.
222, 225 (1928); i5 Iowa L. Rev. 104 (1929). Many states have enacted legislation protecting
the reserve in insurance policies. Ill. Rev. Stat. (194i) c. 73, § 836(g); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933) § 39-4206; Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1940) c. 175, § 144; N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney,
12

Supp. 1941) § 208; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 194o) tit. 40, § 51o..
'3 Afro-American Life Ins. Co. v. La Berth, 136 Fla. 37, 186 So. 241 (1939); Equitable Life
Ins. Co. v. Germantown Trust Co., 94 F. (2d) 898 (C.C.A. 3 d 1938); New York Life Ins.

Co. v. Noble, 34 Okla. 103, 124 Pac. 612 (1912). Contra: Lange v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 252 App. Div. 696, 1 N.Y.S. (2d) 821 (x937), leave to appeal den., 253 App. Div. 866, 2
N.Y.S. (2d) 622 (2938), aff'd 278 N.Y. 626, 16 N.E. (2d) 293 (z938).
Another commonly used type of non-forfeiture clause provides for automatic application
of the proceeds to a particular type of insurance upon default with the right of the insured to
change the type of secondary insurance within the three months period. The right to elect

under this alternative clause does not pass to the beneficiary. Browne v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., iig Pa. Super. 222, i8o At. 746 (1935); Rawson v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 288 Ill. App. 599, 6 N.E. (2d) 474 (1937). Contra: Knapp v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 224 Mo. App. i51, 259 S.W. 862 (1924).
'4 Veal v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 Ga. App. 72x, 65 S.E. 724 (i9o9). It is said that
time is no longer of the essence after the death of the insured and that a formal notice of election
by the beneficiary during the option period is not necessary. Ibid., at 728 and 718; AfroAmerican Life Ins. Co. v. La Berth, 136 Fla. 37, 47, 186 So. 242, 245 (i939).
'5 McCall v. Intemat'l Life Ins. Co., 196 Mo. App. 318, 193 S.W. 86o (z917); cf. Kimball v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 98 Vt. 192, 226 Atl. 553 (1924). In one case similar to the instant case,
it was held that the beneficiary had no right to pay the indebtedness, because the insured did
not have that right before his death. Rick v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App.
1084, 93 S.W. (2d) 1126 (1936).
!6 As the cash value of the policy is decreased by borrowings it seems that the proceeds
would decrease proportionately. Jeske v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 13 Pa. Super. IIS, 272
At. 172 (I934); cf. Toncich v. Home Life Ins. Co., 309 Pa. 336, 163 Atl. 673 (2932); AfroAmerican Life Ins. Co. v. La Berth, 236 Fla. 37, 49, 186 So. 241, 246 (1939); see Gallagher v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 36 N.E. (2d) 780, 783 (Ind. 1942).
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ficiary to insure against the death of a man already dead. The Georgia case, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. George,17 relied upon by the majority, may be objected to on
this ground. Since the equity in the instant case was so small that it could purchase
only a term of extended insurance that would have expired prior to the death of the
insured, it seems that there would have been no forfeiture in a small judgment of a
few dollars based upon paid-up insurance.' 8
A second ground for criticism is the court's handling of the offer of evidence under
Section 92 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act. The importance of this refusal is indicated
by the fact that the court distinguished the case of Equitable Life Assurance Society
v. Brandt9 on the ground that there was a loan agreement in that case providing that
the insured could not repay borrowings after default and thus secure the full benefits
of an option elected under the non-forfeiture clause. This provision was identical with
the one the defendant attempted to introduce in the instant case. Presumably, then,
if the court had permitted the introduction of the agreement, it would have decided
for the defendant. The refusal of the court to consider the offer of evidence denied the
defendant any relief from a judgment based upon an argument to which the defendant
seems to have had no real opportunity to present refuting evidence. The supreme
court's considering of the new argument seems in itself to be a departure from former
practice.20 In the instant case, the court may have felt that hearing the new argument did not constitute unfair surprise," that the insurance company should have
anticipated this new argument by the last time the case was in the trial court. But it
seems difficult to find in the previous history of the case any warning that the plaintiff
intended to advance the theory.
With the possibility that new arguments may be advanced and heard on appeal
and with no partial new trial thereafter, opposing counsel will now be burdened by
Ga. App. 19I, 192 S.E. 514 (1937).
ISNo other cases have-been found in which the net equity was so small that it would not
purchase a sufficient term of extended insurance. In the George case, note 17 supra, the nonforfeiture clause did not provide that the term be reduced, but simply that the amount of recovery be reduced by an amount proportionate to the ratio between the loan and the cash
surrender value.
Where the equity had been entirely dissipated no recovery under any option has been allowed. Meridian Life Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 2oo Ala. 487, 76 So. 429 (1917); Black v. Franklin
Life Ins. Co., x33 Ga. 859, 67 S.E. 79 (igIO); Pitt v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., ioo Mass. 5oo
(1868). But cf. Francis v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 243 Pa. 380, go AtI. 205 (x914), where the
policy did not provide for reducing the benefits in the event of indebtedness.
'9 240 Ala. 26o, ig8 So. 595 (294o).
20Hayward Co. v. Lundoff-Bicknell Co., 365 Ill.
537, 7 N.E. (2d) 289 (1937); Roof v.
Rule, 348 Ill. 370, i8o N.E. 807 (1932); Consumers Petroleum Co. v. Flagler, 310 Ill. App. 241,
33 N.E. (2d) 751 (1941); Davis v. Robinson, 302 Ill. App. 365, 23 N.E. (2d) 816 (1939).
"1"For our procedural scheme contemplates that parties shall come to issue in the trial
forum vested with authority to determine questions of fact. This is essential in order that
parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues
which the trial tribunal is alone competent to decide; it is equally essential in order that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had
no opportunity to introduce evidence." Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941); cases
cited note 20 supra; cf. Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U.S. 220 (1927); Duignan v.
United States, 274 U.S. 195 (1927).
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the necessity of anticipating all possible theories of recovery embraced in the pleaded
facts and of offering all evidence material to any argument which might be advanced
later. If such evidence is objected to as irrelevant, offering counsel will be faced with
the dilemma either of gambling that the argument at which it is aimed will not be advanced later or of revealing to his opponent a better theory than that upon which the
opponent is proceeding. If surplus facts have been pleaded the only alternative open
to perplexed counsel would seem to be to move that certain facts, irrelevant to the
argument then being urged by the opposition but possibly relevant to another argument, be stricken from the pleadings. 22 Such tactics may result in a virtual return to
"theory pleading" in spite of the intent of the Illinois Civil Practice Act to establish
"fact pleading."23

Procedure-Federal Rules-Service of District Court Process Outside the District-[Federal].-The plaintiff brought an action for damages against the Franklin
County Distilling Company in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky and also named the National Distillers Products Corporation a
party defendant. Franklin, a Delaware corporation, carried on business solely within
the eastern district of Kentucky, while National, a Virginia corporation, had its principal place of business in the western district, in Louisville. The plaintiff, also of
Louisville, caused both .corporations to be served personally with process issued from
the western district court. Upon Franklin's appearance to protest jurisdiction, held,
that despite Rule 4 (f)r of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, process of the district
court does not extend beyond the boundaries of the district. Richard v. Franklin
County Distilling Co.'
Before the adoption of the new federal rules in 1938, it was well established that
service of process could not be made outside the federal district where suit was
brought.3 It was also settled that where two or more defendants "resided" in different
Such a procedure would not have been open to the defendant in the instant case because
there were no additional, nonessential facts in the pleadings. The plaintiff's amended complaint upon which the case was tried set forth the policy and the relevant facts as to the payment of premiums by the insured until the last premium upon which he had defaulted. All the
facts alleged were appropriate to each of the arguments subsequently urged by the plaintiff.
's Ill. Rev. Stat. (i941) c. 110, § 157. For a discussion of fact pleading and a justification
for allowing change of theory at trial, consult Clark, Code Pleading x74-78, especially 176
n. 137 (1928).
IRule 4 (f) provides that "All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within
the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, and when a statute of the
United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state." Consult 28 U.S.C.A.
foll. § 723c (I94I) for the rules in their entirety.
2 38

F. Supp. 513 (Ky. 194).

3Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619 (X925); Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet.
(U.S.) *300 (1838); United States Judicial Code §§ 51-52, 36 Stat. iioi (igii), 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 112-13 (1927). This rule was applied to corporations. Herriage v. Texas & Pacific R. Co.,
ii F. (2d) 671 (D. C. La. 1926); Gioia v. Clyde S. S. Co., 3 F. (2d) 822 (D.C.N.Y. 1924); J. E.

Petty & Co., Inc. v. Dock Contractor Co., 283 Fed. 338 (D. C. Pa. 1922); Tauza v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 232 Fed. 294 (D.C. N.Y. 1916). At least one case allowed service of process outside the district. Wefel v. Brown & Son Lumber Co., 58 F. (2d) 667 (D.C. Ala. 1932); Lemon
v. Imperial Window Glass Co., i99 Fed. 927 (D. C. Va. 1912) (semble).

